
Admission to the Bar
Rule 8.4 Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official;
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or
(g) intentionally prejudice or damage his or her client during the course of the professional relationship, except as may be required by Rule 3.3.
Comment
[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client or, in the case of a government lawyer, investigatory personnel, of action the client, or such investigatory personnel, is lawfully entitled to take.
[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. A lawyer's dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation is not mitigated by virtue of the fact that the victim may be the lawyer's partner or law firm. A lawyer who steals funds, for instance, is guilty of the most serious disciplinary violation regardless of whether the victim is the lawyer's employer, partner, law firm, client, or a third party.
[3] The purpose of professional discipline for misconduct is not punishment, but to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession. Lawyer discipline affects only the lawyer's license to practice law. It does not result in incarceration. For this reason, to establish a violation of paragraph (b), the burden of proof is the same as for any other violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct: it must be shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the lawyer committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. Conviction of a crime is conclusive evidence that the lawyer committed a criminal act although, to establish a violation of paragraph (b), it must be shown that the criminal act reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. If it is established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that a lawyer committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, the lawyer may be disciplined for a violation of paragraph (b) although the lawyer is never prosecuted or is acquitted or pardoned for the underlying criminal act.
[4] A showing of actual prejudice to the administration of justice is not required to establish a violation of paragraph (d). Rather, it must only be shown that the act had a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the administration of justice. For example, in State Bar v. DuMont, 52 N.C. App. 1, 277 S.E.2d 827 (1981), modified on other grounds, 304 N.C. 627, 286 S.E.2d 89 (1982), the defendant was disciplined for advising a witness to give false testimony in a deposition even though the witness corrected his statement prior to trial. The phrase "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" in paragraph (d) should be read broadly to proscribe a wide variety of conduct, including conduct that occurs outside the scope of judicial proceedings. In State Bar v. Jerry Wilson, 82 DHC 1, for example, a lawyer was disciplined for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice after forging another individual's name to a guarantee agreement, inducing his wife to notarize the forged agreement, and using the agreement to obtain funds.
[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.
[6] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.
History Note:
Statutory Authority G. 84-23
Adopted July 24, 1997; Amended March 1, 2003.
ETHICS OPINION NOTES
CPR 110. An attorney may not advise a client to seek Dominican divorce knowing that the client will return immediately to North Carolina and continue residence.
CPR 168. An attorney may file personal bankruptcy.
CPR 188. An attorney may not draw deeds or other legal instruments based on land surveys made by unregistered land surveyors.
CPR 342. An attorney should not close a loan where the transaction is conditioned by the lender upon the placement of title insurance with a particular company.
CPR 369. An attorney may close a loan if the lender merely suggests rather than requires the placement of title insurance with a particular company.
RPC 127. An attorney may not deliberately release settlement proceeds which were conditionally delivered without satisfying all conditions precedent.
RPC 136. An attorney may notarize documents which are to be used in legal proceedings in which the attorney appears.
RPC 143. A lawyer who represents or has represented a member of the city council may represent another client before the council provided the lawyer does not attempt improperly to influence the council.
RPC 152. The prosecutor and the defense attorney must see that all material terms of a negotiated plea are disclosed in response to direct questions when the plea is entered in open court.
RPC 159. An attorney may not participate in the resolution of a civil dispute involving allegations against a psychotherapist of sexual involvement with a patient if the settlement is conditioned upon the agreement of the complaining party not to report the misconduct to the appropriate licensing board.
RPC 162. A lawyer may not communicate with the opposing party's nonparty treating physician about the physician's treatment of the opposing party unless the opposing party consents.
RPC 171. A lawyer may tape record a conversation with an opposing lawyer without disclosure to the opposing lawyer.
RPC 180. A lawyer may not passively listen while the opposing party's nonparty treating physician comments on his or her treatment of the opposing party unless the opposing party consents to the communication.
RPC 192. A lawyer may not listen to an illegal tape recording made by his client nor may he use the information on the illegal tape recording to advance his client's case.
RPC 197. A prosecutor must notify defense counsel, jail officials, or other appropriate persons to avoid the unnecessary detention of a criminal defendant after the charges against the defendant have been dismissed by the prosecutor.
RPC 204. It is prejudicial to the administration of justice for a prosecutor to offer special treatment to individuals charged with traffic offenses or minor crimes in exchange for a direct charitable contribution to the local school system.
RPC 221. Absent a court order or law requiring delivery of physical evidence of a crime to the authorities, a lawyer for a criminal defendant may take possession of evidence that is not contraband to examine, test, or inspect the evidence. The lawyer must return inculpatory physical evidence that is not contraband to the source and advise the source of the legal consequences pertaining to the possession or destruction of the evidence.
RPC 236. A lawyer may not issue a subpoena containing misrepresentations as to the pendency of an action, the date or location of a hearing, or a lawyer's authority to obtain documentary evidence.
RPC 243. It is prejudicial to the administration of justice for a prosecutor to threaten to use his discretion to schedule a criminal trial to coerce a plea agreement from a criminal defendant.
98 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. Opinion rules that a lawyer may explain the effect of service of process to a client but may not advise a client to evade service of process.
98 Formal Ethics Opinion 19. Opinion provides guidelines for a lawyer representing a client with a civil claim that also constitutes a crime.
99 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. Opinion rules that a defense lawyer may suggest that the records custodian of plaintiff's medical record deliver the medical record to the lawyer's office in lieu of an appearance at a noticed deposition provided the plaintiff's lawyer consents.
2000 Formal Ethics Opinion 8. Opinion rules that a lawyer acting as a notary must follow the law when acknowledging a signature on a document.
2001 Formal Ethics Opinion 12. Opinion rules that a closing lawyer may not counsel or assist a client to affix excess excise tax stamps on an instrument for registration with the register of deeds.
2003 FEO 11 - Opinion rules that a departed lawyer must deal honestly with the members of her former firm when dividing a legal fee.
2005 Formal Ethics Opinion 3.
Opinion rules that a lawyer may not threaten to report an opposing party or a witness to immigration officials to gain an advantage in civil settlement negotiations.
CASE NOTES
Concealment of Material Facts. - Intentionally encouraging the concealment of material facts relevant to the identity of the driver in a driving under the influence prosecution is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Such conduct raises serious doubts as to the attorney's desire to bring about a just result in such a prosecution and adversely reflects on the attorney's fitness to practice law. North Carolina State Bar v. Graves , 50 N.C. App. 450, 274 S.E.2d 396 (1981).
Misrepresentation as to Opposing Party's Whereabouts. - An attorney clearly engaged in conduct which involved fraud, dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation when, in a divorce action, she failed to inform the court of a letter which contained the opposing party's return address, while at the same time presenting to the court an affidavit she had drafted in which her client swore that her husband's whereabouts were unknown and could not with due diligence be ascertained. North Carolina State Bar v. Wilson , 74 N.C. App. 777, 330 S.E.2d 280 (1985).
Conversion of Client's Check. - An attorney's act of forging a client's endorsement on an insurance check received by the attorney and converting the check to personal use constituted conduct involving moral turpitude. North Carolina State Bar v. Whitted , 82 N.C. App. 531, 347 S.E.2d 60 (1986), aff'd , 319 N.C. 398, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987).
Letter to Attorney Representing Former Clients. - Findings by Disciplinary Hearing Commission did not support the Commission's conclusion that the defendant-attorney had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by writing a letter to the attorney representing the defendant-attorney's former clients where the Commission's order did not state whether the letter constituted a threat, the nature of the threat, if any, and how the conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. North Carolina State Bar v. Beaman , 100 N.C. App. 677, 398 S.E.2d 68 (1990).
Misappropriation of Funds. - The attorney misappropriated client funds in violation of Rule 1.2(b) of the (Superseded) 1985 Rules of Professional Conduct. It was no defense that the attorney intended at all times to return the funds and in fact did so. Evidence sufficient to support a charge of embezzlement also constitutes conduct involving dishonesty in violation of Rule 1.2(c) of the 1985 Rules of Professional Conduct. North Carolina State Bar v. Mulligan , 101 N.C. App. 524, 400 S.E.2d 123 (1991).
Lending Money to Clients. - The State Bar's hearing committee's finding adequately supported its conclusion that the defendant violated Rules 2.1 and 5.3(B) of Professional Responsibility where the undisputed facts were that: (1) the defendant kept $ 20,000.00 in his trust account for several years which came from his brother's company, and (2) he loaned this money to three clients to pay for one client's surgery; another client's rent and payments on a car note; and a third client's surgical, medical and travel expenses. North Carolina State Bar v. Harris,
137 N.C. App. 207, 527 S.E.2d 728 (2000).
Cited in North Carolina State Bar v. Nelson , 107 N.C. App. 543, 421 S.E.2d 163 (1992).
Conviction of Crime. - Conviction of a crime is not a necessary element in a disciplinary proceeding. North Carolina State Bar v. Rush , 121 N.C. App. 488, 466 S.E.2d 340 (1996).
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