Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) the representation of one or more clients may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Comment
General Principles
[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rule 1.0(f) and (c).
[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).
[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29] to this Rule.
[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The withdrawing lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse
[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.
[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.
Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation
[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client may be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent a seller of commercial real estate, a real estate developer and a commercial lender is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself preclude the representation or require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.
Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons
[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.
Personal Interest Conflicts
[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific Rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).
[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.
[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.19.
Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service
[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.
Prohibited Representations
[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.
[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).
[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest.
[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(n)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).
Informed Consent
[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(f) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).
[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.
Consent Confirmed in Writing
[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(c). See also Rule 1.0(o) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(c). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.
Revoking Consent
[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.
Consent to Future Conflict
[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).
Conflicts in Litigation
[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.
[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.
[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.
Nonlitigation Conflicts
[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].
[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.
[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. See Comment [15]. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.
Special Considerations in Common Representation
[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.
[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.
[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.
[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).
[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
Organizational Clients
[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.
[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 84-23
Adopted by the Supreme Court: July 24, 1997
Amendments Approved by the Supreme Court: March 1, 2003
Ethics Opinion Notes
I. GENERALCONFLICTS
CPR 9. An attorney may not give a title opinion to an individual and then represent another person in a boundary dispute against that individual.
CPR 15. A lawyer/guardian may not give a title opinion to the purchaser of his ward's property.
CPR 46. Once it is determined that attorneys from same firm have undertaken to represent adverse parties, one must withdraw and the other may continue only with the consent of all involved.
CPR 55. An attorney appointed as examiner of title is not prohibited from representing petitioners or respondents in actions unrelated to the Torrens proceeding.
CPR 147. An attorney cannot defend an action brought by a former client when confidential information obtained during the prior representation would be relevant to the defense of the current action.
CPR 171. A part-time county attorney may not serve as guardian ad litem if official duties include advising Department of Social Services.
CPR 179. An attorney may not represent a municipality and a distributee of an estate suing the municipality.
CPR 216. An attorney may not serve as receiver and as attorney for a judgment creditor.
CPR 249. An attorney who owns an insurance agency may not represent claimants against persons insured by companies his agency represents.
CPR 255. An attorney who is employed by an insurer to defend its insureds on a regular basis represents the insurer and the insureds and, if a conflict develops between the insurer and an insured, the attorney has a duty to advise the insured to seek independent counsel. The attorney may represent a plaintiff against the insurer, but he or she should notify the insurer and have the informed consent of plaintiff.
CPR 281. An attorney may sue another attorney for malpractice on behalf of a client even though the attorney for the plaintiff owns stock in the defendant's liability insurance company.
CPR 286. An attorney may participate in a mediation service with marriage counselors but should not later represent either party in domestic litigation.
CPR 317. An attorney appointed to represent a state official or agency may not represent other clients in a suit against the same official or agency, another official or agency under the jurisdiction of that same official or agency or another official or agency with authority over the official or agency. Nor should an attorney represent one official or agency while representing other clients against another official or agency if both of the officials or agencies are under the jurisdiction of the same official or agency.
CPR 323. An attorney may not act as a friend and attempt to mediate a domestic problem and later represent the wife in domestic litigation.
CPR 344. An attorney for a school board is not automatically disqualified from representing criminal defendants despite the school board's interest in fines and forfeitures.
RPC 18. An attorney may not simultaneously represent shareholders in a derivative action and the corporation's landlord on a claim for backPCrent.
RPC 22. An attorney may not represent the administratrix officially and personally where her interests in the two roles are in conflict without the consent of the heirs.
RPC 24. An attorney may not purchase his client's property at an execution sale on his own account.
RPC 28. An attorney may represent the estate of pilot and the estate of passenger in a wrongful death case against the airplane manufacturer if attorney is convinced that there was no pilot negligence and if the representatives of both estates consent.
RPC 54. A lawyer who represents a criminal defendant from whose possession property was seized may not without consent seek the property as a fine or forfeiture on behalf of the local school board.
RPC 55. A member of the Attorney General's staff may prosecute appeals of adverse Medicaid decisions against the Department of Human Resources, which is represented by another member of the Attorney General's staff.
RPC 56. A lawyer may represent a plaintiff against an insurance company's insured while defending other persons insured by the company in unrelated matters.
RPC 59. A lawyer may represent an insurer and its insured as co-plaintiffs in a declaratory judgment action.
RPC 60. Subject to general conflict of interest rules, a lawyer may represent police officers who are referred by a professional organization of which they are members on a case-by-case basis and also represent criminal defendants.
RPC 65. The public defender's office should be considered as a single law firm and staff attorneys may not represent codefendants with conflicting interests unless both consent and can be adequately represented.
RPC 72. An attorney hired by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to prosecute criminal charges before a tribal court may represent defendants in state or federal court despite the fact that the defendants have been arrested by members of the tribal police force.
RPC 73. Opinion clarifies two lines of authority in prior ethics opinions. Where an attorney serves on a governing body, such as a county commission, the attorney is disqualified from representing criminal defendants where a member of the sheriff's department is a prosecuting witness. The attorney's partners are not disqualified.
Where an attorney advises a governing body, such as a county commission, but is not a commissioner herself, and in that capacity represents the sheriff's department relative to criminal matters, the attorney may not represent criminal defendants if a member of the sheriff's department will be a prosecuting witness. In this situation the attorney's partners would also be disqualified from representing the criminal defendants.
RPC 74. A firm which employs a paralegal is not disqualified from representing an interest adverse to that of a party represented by the firm for which the paralegal previously worked if the paralegal is screened from participation in the case.
RPC 91. An attorney employed by the insurer to represent the insured and its own interests may not send the insurer a letter on behalf of the insured demanding settlement within the policy limits.
RPC 92. An attorney representing both the insurer and the insured need not surrender to the insured copies of all correspondence concerning the case between herself and the insurer.
RPC 95. An assistant district attorney may prosecute cases while serving on the school board.
RPC 100. An attorney serving on a hospital ethics committee is not automatically disqualified from representing interests adverse to the hospital or its staff physicians.
RPC 102. A lawyer may not permit the employment of court reporting services to be influenced by the possibility that the lawyer's employees might receive premiums, prizes or other personal benefits.
RPC 103. A lawyer for the insured and the insurer may not enter voluntary dismissal of the insured's counterclaim without the insured's consent.
RPC 105. A public defender may represent criminal defendants while serving on the school board.
RPC 109. An attorney may not represent parents as guardians ad litem for their injured child and as individuals concerning their related tort claims after having received a joint settlement offer which is insufficient to fully satisfy all claims.
RPC 110. An attorney employed by an insurer to defend in the name of the defendant pursuant to underinsured motorist coverage may not communicate with that individual without the consent of another attorney employed to represent that individual by her liability insurer, and the attorney employed by the liability insurer may not take a position on behalf of the insurer which is adverse to the insured.
RPC 111. An attorney retained by a liability insurer to defend its insured may not advise insured or insurer regarding the plaintiff's offer to limit the insured's liability in exchange for consent to an amendment of the complaint to add a punitive damages claim.
RPC 112. An attorney retained by an insurer to defend its insured may not advise insurer or insured regarding the plaintiff's offer to limit the insured's liability in exchange for an admission of liability.
RPC 123. An attorney may represent parents and an independent guardian ad litem for their child concerning related tort claims under certain circumstances.
RPC 131. An attorney employed to represent a county in appellate matters may also sue the county's department of social services if the county and the plaintiffs consent.
RPC 140. There is no disqualifying conflict of interest where an attorney is retained by an insurer to represent an insured during the pendency of a declaratory judgment action relating to coverage in which the attorney is a nonparticipant.
RPC 151. Where an insurance company and its policyholder are both parties to an action, a lawyer who is a full-time employee of the insurance company may not represent both the insurance company and the policyholder because of the "diluted responsibility" to the policyholder created by the employment relationship between the lawyer and the insurance company.
RPC 154. An attorney may not represent the insured, her liability insurer and the same insurer relative to underinsured motorist coverage carried by the plaintiff.
RPC 160. A lawyer whose associate is a member of a hospital's board of trustees may not sue the hospital on behalf of a client. ( But see 2002 FEO 2)
RPC 168. A lawyer may ask her client for a waiver of objection to a possible future representation presenting a conflict of interest if certain conditions are met.
RPC 170. A lawyer may jointly represent a personal injury victim and the medical insurance carrier that holds a subrogation agreement with the victim provided the victim consents and the lawyer withdraws upon the development of an actual conflict of interest.
RPC 177. A lawyer may represent the insured, his liability insurer, and the same insurer relative to underinsured motorist coverage carried by the plaintiff if the insurer waives its subrogation rights against the insured and the plaintiff executes a covenant not to enforce judgment.
RPC 207. A lawyer may represent an insured in a bad faith action against his insurer for failure to pay a liability claim brought by a claimant who is represented by the same lawyer.
RPC 228. A lawyer for a personal injury victim may not execute an agreement to indemnify the tortfeasor's liability insurance carrier against the unpaid liens of medical providers.
RPC 229. A lawyer who jointly represented a husband and wife in the preparation and execution of estate planning documents may not prepare a codicil to the will of one spouse without the knowledge of the other spouse if the codicil will affect adversely the interests of the other spouse or each spouse agreed not to change the estate plan without informing the other spouse.
RPC 251. A lawyer may represent multiple claimants in a personal injury case, even though the available insurance proceeds are insufficient to compensate all claimants fully, provided each claimant, or his or her legal representative, gives informed consent to the representation and the lawyer does not advocate against the interest of any client in the division of the insurance proceeds.
2000 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. Opinion rules that a lawyer who represented a husband and wife in a joint Chapter 13 bankruptcy case may continue to represent one of the spouses after the other spouse disappears or becomes unresponsive, unless the lawyer is aware of any fact or circumstance that would make the continued representation of the remaining spouse an actual conflict of interest with the prior representation of the other spouse.
2000 Formal Ethics Opinion 4. Opinion rules that a lawyer may sign a statement acknowledging a finance company's interest in a client's recovery subject to certain conditions.
2000 Formal Ethics Opinion 9. Opinion explores the situations in which a lawyer who is also a CPA may provide legal services and accounting services from the same office.
2001 Formal Ethics Opinion 6. Opinion examines when a lawyer has a conflict of interest in representing various family members on claims for a deceased employee's workers' compensation death benefits.
2002 Formal Ethics Opinion 1. Opinion rules that a lawyer may participate in a non-profit organization that promotes a cooperative method for resolving family law disputes although the client is required to make full disclosure and the lawyer is required to withdraw before court proceedings commence.
2002 Formal Ethics Opinion 3. Opinion rules that a lawyer for an estate may seek removal of the personal representative if the personal representative's breach of fiduciary duties constitutes grounds for removal under the law.
2002 Formal Ethics Opinion 6. Opinion rules that the lawyer for the plaintiff may not prepare the answer to a complaint for an unrepresented adverse party to file pro se.
2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 1. A lawyer must withdraw from joint representation of a general contractor and a surety if a position advanced on behalf of the general contractor is frivolous, for the purpose of delay or interferes with a legal duty owed by the surety to the claimant.
2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 7. A lawyer may not prepare a power of attorney for the benefit of the principal at the request of another individual or third-party payer without consulting with, exercising independent professional judgment on behalf of, and obtaining consent from the principal.
2003 Formal Ethics Opinion 12. Opinion rules that an insurance defense lawyer may give the insured and the insurance carrier an evaluation of a pending case, including settlement prospects, but may not give an opinion to the carrier on whether to decline to settle within policy limits and go to trial if the opinion is contrary to the wishes of the insured.
2005 Formal Ethics Opinion 1. Opinion rules that a lawyer may not appear before a judge who is a family member without consent from all parties and, although consent is not required, the other members of the firm must disclose the relationship before appearing before the judge.
2005 Formal Ethics Opinion 7. Opinion rules that an attorney may recommend that a prospective client use a computer in the attorney’s office and the services of an Internet-based company to complete a required bankruptcy certification form.
2006 Formal Ethics Opinion 1. A lawyer who represents the employer and its workers' compensation carrier must share the case evaluation, litigation plan, and other information with both clients unless the clients give informed consent to withhold such information.
2006 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. A lawyer may only refer a client to a financing company if certain conditions are met.
2006 Formal Ethics Opinion 5. The county tax attorney may not bid at a tax foreclosure sale of real property.
2007 Formal Ethics Opinion 7. Opinion rules that a lawyer may continue to represent a husband and wife in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy after they divorce provided the conditions on common representation set forth in Rule 1.7 are satisfied.
2007 Formal Ethics Opinion 10. Opinion holds a lawyer employed by a school board may serve as an administrative hearing officer with the informed consent of the board.
2007 Formal Ethics Opinion 11. Opinion rules that a lawyer is not required to withdraw from representing one client if the other client revokes consent without good reason and an evaluation of the factors set out in comment [21] to Rule 1.7 and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers indicates continued representation is favored.
2008 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. A lawyer is not prohibited from advising a school board sitting in an adjudicative capacity in a disciplinary or employment proceeding while another lawyer from the same firm represents the administration; however, such dual representation is harmful to the public's perception of the fairness of the proceeding and should be avoided.
2008 Formal Ethics Opinion 12. A lawyer may not initiate foreclosure on a deed of trust on a client's property while still representing the client.
2009 Formal Ethics Opinion 9. Opinion describes reasonable procedures for a computer-based conflicts checking system.
2009 Formal Ethics Opinion 11. A lawyer may undertake the representation of a debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, although the lender is a current client, if the lawyer reasonably believes that he will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to the debtor in the bankruptcy action while protecting the lender’s interests in those matters where the lawyer represents the lender and both clients give informed consent.
2009 Formal Ethics Opinion 12. A lawyer may prepare an affidavit and confession of judgment for an unrepresented adverse party provided the lawyer explains who he represents and does not give the unrepresented party legal advice; however, the lawyer may not prepare a waiver of exemptions for the adverse party.
2010 Formal Ethics Opinion 3. A lawyer who currently represents a police officer in an internal affairs investigation may not concurrently represent a person charged with a criminal offense if the police officer is one of the prosecuting witnesses and will be subject to cross-examination.
2010 Formal Ethics Opinion 12. A hiring law firm may ask an incoming law school graduate to provide sufficient information as to his prior legal experience so that the hiring law firm can identify potential conflicts of interest.
2010 Formal Ethics Opinion 13. A lawyer’s self-interest in promoting his own financial services company must not distort his independent professional judgment in the provision of legal services to the client including referral of the client to the lawyer’s own ancillary business.
2012 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. A lawyer-mediator may not draft a business contract for pro se parties to mediation.
2012 Formal Ethics Opinion 9. A lawyer asked to represent a child in a contested custody or visitation case should decline the appointment unless the order of appointment identifies the lawyer’s role and specifies the responsibilities of the lawyer.
2014 Formal Ethics Opinion 6. A lawyer who provides free brief consultations to members of a nonprofit organization must still screen for conflicts prior to conducting a consultation.
2014 Formal Ethics Opinion 10. A lawyer who handles adoptions as part of her or his law practice and also owns a financial interest in a for-profit adoption agency may, with informed consent, represent an adopting couple utilizing the services of the adoption agency but may not represent the biological parents.
2015 Formal Ethics Opinion 4. Opinion analyzes a lawyer's professional responsibilities when she discovers that she made an error that may adversely impact the client's case.
2016 Formal Ethics Opinion 3. A lawyer working for a private law firm may not negotiate for employment with another firm if the firm represents a party adverse to the lawyer’s client unless both clients give informed consent.
2018 Formal Ethics Opinion 4. A lawyer may offer clients on-site access to a financial brokerage company as a payment option for legal fees so long as the lawyer is satisfied that the financial arrangements offered by the company are legal, the lawyer receives no consideration from the company, and the lawyer does not recommend one payment option over another.
2019 Formal Ethics Opinion 1: A lawyer may not jointly represent clients and prepare a separation agreement.
2019 Formal Ethics Opinion 3: Opinion rules that an ongoing sexual relationship between opposing counsel creates a conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7(a).
2020 Formal Ethics Opinion 4. Opinion concludes a lawyer may not invest in a fund that provides litigation financing if the lawyer’s practice accepts clients who obtain litigation financing.
II. REAL PROPERTY CONFLICTS.
CPR 100. (See also RPC 210 and 97 Formal Ethics Opinion 8.) In the usual residential loan transaction:
(a) A lawyer may ethically represent both the borrower and the lender.
(b) If the lawyer intends not to represent both the borrower and the lender, he must give timely notice to the one he intends not to represent of this fact, so that the one not represented may secure separate and timely representation.
(c) If the lawyer does not give such notice, he shall be deemed to represent both the borrower and the lender.
(d) If the lawyer represents only the borrower, he may nevertheless ethically provide the title and lien priority assurances required by the lender as a condition of the loan.
(e) The lawyer shall clearly state to his client(s), whether the borrower or the lender, or both, whom he represents and the general scope of his representation.
(f) If the lawyer does not represent both principals, and the one he does not represent retains another lawyer to represent him, both lawyers should fully cooperate with each other in serving the interests of their respective clients and in closing the loan promptly.
(g) If the lawyer represents both the borrower and the lender, he may be ethically barred from representing either one (without the consent of the other) if a controversy arises between the borrower and the lender before, during or after the closing.
It is not unethical for a lawyer representing the borrower and the lender (or either) in the usual residential loan transaction to prepare a deed from the seller to the buyer, collect the purchase price for the seller, or draft other documents (such as a second deed of trust and not secured thereby) as may be necessary to complete the transaction between the seller and the buyer in accordance with their agreement, and charge the seller therefor.
It is not unethical for the lawyer representing the borrower, the lender and the seller (or one or more of them) to provide the title insurer with an opinion on title sufficient to issue a mortgagee's title insurance policy, the premium for which is normally paid by the borrower.
CPR 137. An attorney/trustee in a foreclosure proceeding may not represent the lender when the foreclosure is contested by the borrower. (But see RPC 82.)
CPR 166. An attorney/trustee cannot ethically represent either the lender or the borrower in a role of advocacy at any state of the foreclosure proceeding. In the absence of controversy the trustee may present, on behalf of the lender, the evidence necessary to support the clerk's findings essential to a foreclosure order. Even if the proceeding is adversary, he may ethically perform for himself such legal services as are necessary to the performance of his fiduciary duties. ( See also RPC 82.)
CPR 201. When an attorney/trustee learns that a foreclosure will be contested, he may resign as trustee and represent the lender. ( See also RPC 82.)
CPR 220. An attorney's secretary may not be trustee if the attorney wishes to represent the lender at a contested foreclosure.
CPR 264. After initiating foreclosure, an attorney/trustee may not represent the lender in defense of the borrower's suit for injunctive relief. ( See also RPC 82.)
CPR 275. An attorney who is part owner of a mortgage brokerage firm may certify title to real property with respect to which the mortgage broker has arranged financing.
CPR 297. An attorney/trustee cannot represent a husband-debtor in a partition action against his wife-debtor, but he may resign as trustee and then represent the husband. ( See also RPC 82.)
CPR 305. An attorney/trustee cannot represent the lender in bankruptcy court in seeking relief from an automatic stay in order to commence foreclosure. ( See also RPC 82.)
RPC 3. An attorney/trustee is not prohibited from continuing to serve as trustee in a contested foreclosure if he represented the seller at the closing. ( See also RPC 82.)
RPC 40. For the purposes of a real estate transaction, an attorney may, with proper notice to the borrower, represent only the lender, and the lender may prepare the closing documents. ( See also RPC 41.)
RPC 44. A closing attorney must follow the lender's closing instruction that closing documents be recorded prior to disbursement.
RPC 46. An attorney acting as trustee in a foreclosure proceeding may not, while serving in that capacity, file a motion to have an automatic stay lifted in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. ( See also RPC 82.)
RPC 49. Attorneys who own stock in a real estate company may refer clients to the company if such would be in the clients' best interest and there is full disclosure, and such attorneys may not close transactions brokered by the real estate firm.
RPC 64. A lawyer who served as a trustee may after foreclosure sue the former debtor on behalf of the purchaser. ( See also RPC 82.)
RPC 78. A closing attorney cannot make conditional delivery of trustee account checks to real estate agent before depositing loan proceeds against which checks are to be drawn.
RPC 82. This opinion comprehensively revises the ethical responsibilities of the attorney-trustee.
RPC 83. The significance of an attorney's personal interest in property determines whether he or she has a conflict of interest sufficient to disqualify him or her from rendering a title opinion concerning that property.
RPC 86. Opinion discusses disbursement against uncollected funds, accounting for earnest money paid outside closing and representation of the seller. ( See also RPC 191.)
RPC 88. A lawyer may close a real estate transaction brokered by a real estate firm which employs the attorney's secretary as a part-time real estate broker.
RPC 90. A lawyer who as a trustee initiated a foreclosure proceeding may resign as trustee after the foreclosure is contested and act as lender's counsel. ( See also RPC 82.)
RPC 121. A borrower's lawyer may render a legal opinion to the lender.
RPC 185. A lawyer who owns any stock in a title insurance agency may not give title opinions to the title insurance company for which the title insurance agency issues policies.
RPC 188. A lawyer may close a real estate transaction brokered by the lawyer's spouse with the consent of the parties to the transaction.
RPC 201. Opinion explores the circumstances under which a lawyer who is also a real estate salesperson may close real estate transactions brokered by the real estate company with which he is affiliated.
RPC 210. Opinion examines the circumstances in which it is acceptable for a lawyer to represent the buyer, seller, and the lender in the closing of a residential real estate transaction.
RPC 248. A lawyer who owns stock in a mortgage brokerage corporation may not act as the settlement agent for a loan brokered by the corporation nor may the other lawyers in the firm certify title or act as settlement agent for the closing.
97 Formal Ethics Opinion 8. Opinion examines the circumstances in which it is acceptable for the lawyer who regularly represents a real estate developer to represent the buyer and the developer in the closing of a residential real estate transaction.
98 Formal Ethics Opinion 10. Opinion rules that an insurance defense lawyer may not disclose confidential information about an insured's representation in bills submitted to an independent audit company at the insurance carrier's request unless the insured consents.
98 Formal Ethics Opinion 11. Opinion rules that the fiduciary relationship that arises when a lawyer serves as an escrow agent demands that the lawyer be impartial to both the obligor and the obligee and, therefore, the lawyer may not act as advocate for either party against the other. Once the fiduciary duties of the escrow agent terminate, the lawyer may take a position adverse to the obligor or the obligee provided the lawyer is not otherwise disqualified.
99 Formal Ethics Opinion 1. Opinion rules that a lawyer may not accept a referral fee or solicitor's fee for referring a client to an investment advisor.
99 Formal Ethics Opinion 8. Opinion rules that a lawyer may represent all parties in a residential real estate closing and subsequently represent only one party in an escrow dispute provided the lawyer insures that the conditions for waiver of an objection to a possible future conflict of interest set forth in RPC 168 are satisfied.
2004 Formal Ethics Opinion 3. Opinion rules that a lawyer may represent both the lender and the trustee on a deed of trust in a dispute with the borrower if the conditions for common representation can be satisfied.
2004 Formal Ethics Opinion 10. Opinion rules that the lawyer for the buyer of residential real estate may prepare the deed without creating a client-lawyer relationship with the seller provided the lawyer makes specific disclosures to the seller and clarifies her role for the seller.
2006 Formal Ethics Opinion 3. A lawyer who represented the trustee or served as the trustee in a foreclosure proceeding at which the lender acquired the subject property may, under some circumstances, represent all parties on the closing of the sale of the property by the lender provided the lawyer concludes that his judgment will not be impaired by loyalty to the lender and there is full disclosure and informed consent.
2007 Formal Ethics Opinion 9. Opinion rules that a closing lawyer must comply with the conditions placed upon the delivery of a deed by the seller, including recording the deed and disbursing proceeds, despite receiving contrary instructions from the buyer.
2008 Formal Ethics Opinion 7. A closing lawyer shall not record and disburse when a seller has delivered the deed to the lawyer but the buyer instructs the lawyer to take no further action to close the transaction.
2008 Formal Ethics Opinion 11. A lawyer may serve as the trustee in a foreclosure proceeding while simultaneously representing the beneficiary of the deed of trust on unrelated matters and that the other lawyers in the firm may also continue to represent the beneficiary on unrelated matters.
2011 Formal Ethics Opinion 4. A lawyer may not agree to procure title insurance exclusively from a particular title insurance agency on every transaction referred to the lawyer by a person associated with the agency.
2011 Formal Ethics Opinion 5. A lawyer may not represent the beneficiary of the deed of trust in a contested foreclosure if the lawyer’s spouse and paralegal own an interest in the closely-held corporate trustee.
2012 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. A lawyer-mediator may not draft a business contract for pro se parties to mediation.
2013 Formal Ethics Opinion 4. Opinion examines the ethical duties of a lawyer representing both the buyer and the seller on the purchase of a foreclosure property and the lawyer’s duties when the representation is limited to the seller.
2013 Formal Ethics Opinion 5. A lawyer/trustee must explain his role in a foreclosure proceeding to any unrepresented party that is an unsophisticated consumer of legal services; if he fails to do so and that party discloses material confidential information, the lawyer may not represent the other party in a subsequent, related adversarial proceeding unless there is informed consent.
2013 Formal Ethics Opinion 14. Common representation in a commercial real estate loan closing is, in most instances, a “nonconsentable” conflict meaning that a lawyer may not ask the borrower and the lender to consent to common representation.
2014 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. A lawyer may not represent both the trustee and the secured creditor in a contested foreclosure proceeding.
2021 Formal Ethics Opinion 1. Opinion rules that a lawyer may only represent multiple parties in contemporaneous real estate closings if lawyer can satisfy the requirements set out in Rule 1.7(b) regarding concurrent conflicts of interest.
Ethics Opinion Notes
2022 Formal Ethics Opinion 2. Opinion rules that a privately retained lawyer may provide limited representation to a criminal defendant who has been appointed counsel if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances.
