

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA WAKE COUNTY	BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING COMMISSION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR 17 DHC 25
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, Plaintiff v. JERRY B. CLAYTON, ROBERT W. MYRICK, ROBERT D. McCLANAHAN, RONALD G. COULTER, AND GLADYS NICOLE CLAYTON, Attorneys, Defendants	CONSENT ORDER OF DISCIPLINE AS TO DEFENDANTS JERRY B. CLAYTON, ROBERT W. MYRICK, ROBERT D. McCLANAHAN, AND RONALD G. COULTER[1]

THIS MATTER came on for consideration before a Hearing Panel of the Disciplinary Hearing Commission composed of Donald C. Prentiss, Chair, and members Fred W. DeVore, III and Michael S. Edwards. Jennifer A. Porter represented Plaintiff, the North Carolina State Bar. Defendant Jerry B. Clayton was represented by Alan M. Schneider. Defendant Robert W. Myrick was represented by F. Lane Williamson. Defendant Robert D. McClanahan was represented by Amos G. Tyndall. Defendant Ronald G. Coulter was represented by Douglas J. Brocker.

Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter consent to amendment of the Complaint to conform to the evidence developed during the litigation of this case, including to the amendment of the rule violations at issue with respect to Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter as reflected in the Conclusions of Law made in this Order. Plaintiff and Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter stipulate and agree to the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited in this consent order and to the discipline imposed. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter have freely and voluntarily stipulated to the foregoing findings of fact and consents to the conclusions of law and entry of the order of discipline. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter freely and voluntarily waive any and all right to appeal the entry of this consent order of discipline.

Based upon the pleadings in this matter, the stipulations of fact by Plaintiff and Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter, and with the consent of the Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter, the Hearing Panel hereby enters the following:

[1] This order does not apply to Defendant Gladys Nicole Clayton.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff, the North Carolina State Bar ("State Bar"), is a body duly organized under the laws of North Carolina and is the proper party to bring this proceeding under the authority granted it in Chapter 84 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, and the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar (Chapter 1 of Title 27 of the North Carolina Administrative Code).

2. Defendant Jerry B. Clayton was admitted to the North Carolina State Bar in 1970, and is, and was at all times referred to herein, an attorney at law licensed to practice in North Carolina, subject to the laws of the State of North Carolina, the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

3. Defendant Robert W. Myrick was admitted to the North Carolina State Bar in 1971, and is, and was at all times referred to herein, an attorney at law licensed to practice in North Carolina, subject to the laws of the State of North Carolina, the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

4. Defendant Robert D. McClanahan was admitted to the North Carolina State Bar in 1978, and is, and was at all times referred to herein, an attorney at law licensed to practice in North Carolina, subject to the laws of the State of North Carolina, the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

5. Defendant Ronald G. Coulter was admitted to the North Carolina State Bar in 1980, and is, and was at all times referred to herein, an attorney at law licensed to practice in North Carolina, subject to the laws of the State of North Carolina, the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

6. During all or part of the relevant periods referred to herein, Defendants were engaged in the practice of law in the State of North Carolina and maintained a law office operating under the name of Clayton, Myrick, McClanahan, & Coulter, P.L.L.C. (hereinafter "the firm") in Durham, Durham County, North Carolina.

7. On March 17, 2015, the firm's trust account was audited subject to a subpoena for random audit served on N. Clayton.

8. The following violations of Rule 1.15-3 were found during the random audit:

   a. The firm did not have any quarterly reconciliations for the firm's trust account for the preceding year.

   b. The firm had only three monthly reconciliations for the firm's trust account for the preceding year.

   c. The firm had not identified the client for which cash deposits were made into the trust account.

d. The firm occasionally failed to indicate on trust account checks the client from whose funds in the trust account the trust account check was drawn.

9. Pursuant to 27 N.C. Admin. Code § 1B.0128(b), on May 11, 2015 the State Bar sent N. Clayton a letter seeking to confirm N. Clayton had taken appropriate corrective action to come into compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

10. The State Bar requested N. Clayton confirm compliance with Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by providing a trust account reconciliation.

11. Despite repeated requests from May 2015 through February 2017 pursuant to the random audit and then in the course of a grievance investigation, N. Clayton did not provide the requested trust account reconciliation.

Concurrent requests to J. Clayton for reconciliation in December 2016 and February 2017

12. On December 6, 2016, the State Bar served J. Clayton with a letter of notice concerning a notice of insufficient funds received by the State Bar concerning the firm's trust account.

13. The State Bar asked J. Clayton to include in his response to the letter of notice a copy of the firm's most recent three-way reconciliation for the firm's trust account along with supporting documentation. The three-way quarterly reconciliation required under Rule 1.15-3(d)(1) that would have been most recent to the State Bar's request would have been for the third quarter of 2016.

14. A response signed by J. Clayton dated December 14, 2016 was received by the State Bar but it did not include the requested three-way quarterly reconciliation with supporting documents.

15. On February 16, 2017, the State Bar sent J. Clayton a letter calling to his attention his failure to provide the requested reconciliation and supporting documents, and asked him to provide the reconciliation and documents by March 3, 2017.

16. J. Clayton did not respond to the State Bar's February 16, 2017 letter and did not provide the requested three-way quarterly reconciliation.

17. J. Clayton did not receive this letter and discovered in May 2017 that the firm's bookkeeper had instructed the firm's staff to give her letters from the State Bar directed to J. Clayton.

Subpoenas to J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter for reconciliations

18. On March 10, 2017, the State Bar served subpoenas on J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter requiring the production by 10:00 a.m. on March 27, 2017 of documents including the quarterly reconciliations required by Rule 1.15-3(d)(1) for the third and fourth quarters of 2016 with itemized supporting documentation.

19. In response, N. Clayton prepared documentation consisting of three-way reconciliation forms and supporting documents and arranged for the documentation to be delivered to the State Bar.

20. The supporting documents attached to the three-way reconciliation forms included printed reports from the firm's trust account software and trust account records printed from the bank's website.

21. The date on which certain of those software reports and website records were printed was covered with white-out tape on documents attached to each month's reconciliation form.

22. The covered date was March 27, 2017 on records containing white-out tape attached to the July, August, September, October, and December 2016 reconciliations, with the exception of one of the reports attached to the December 2016 reconciliation which had a covered date of January 26, 2017.

23. The covered date was March 26, 2017 on bank records printed from the bank's website included with the November 2016 reconciliation.

24. There were handwritten reconciliation notations on certain of the documents with covered March 2017 print dates, including those attached to the reconciliations for August 2016, September 2016, October 2016, November 2016, and December 2016.

Subsequent inquiries to all Defendants

25. The State Bar served all Defendants by certified mail with requests that each respond to the concern that they had attempted to mislead the State Bar regarding when the reconciliations produced on March 27, 2017 had been conducted by covering the print dates with white-out tape, and to the concern that the firm was still not timely reconciling its trust account since it appeared that these reconciliations for July through December 2016 had not been done until March 26 and 27, 2017.

26. J. Clayton was served with the State Bar's request by certified mail on March 30, 2017. His response was due on April 28, 2017. J. Clayton failed to respond to the State Bar's letter. Due to the above referenced diversion of mail, J. Clayton did not discover this inquiry to him until his receipt of the State Bar's May 5, 2017 letter to him regarding his failure to respond, referenced below.

27. R. McClanahan was served with the State Bar's request contained in a letter of notice by certified mail on April 4, 2017. His response was due on April 19, 2017. R. McClanahan failed to respond to the State Bar's letter of notice. R. McClanahan was transitioning to a semi-retired status during this time and was rarely in the office, although the firm's address remained his address of record with the State Bar. R. McClanahan did not become aware of the letter of notice until after the deadline to respond had passed.

28. R. Myrick responded by letter dated April 12, 2017, in which he stated:

a. He did not prepare and was not involved with the preparation of the documents produced in response to the subpoena, and was unaware at the time of the subpoena which the firm signed for on his behalf but of which he was not notified.

b. He is not present in the firm on a regular basis.

c. Although he utilized the firm's trust account he was not involved in the management or reconciliation of the trust account. He believed that the firm was audited by the State Bar the prior year and was found to be in compliance with the State Bar rules.

29. R. Coulter responded by letter dated April 13, 2017, in which he stated:

a. Although he utilized the firm's trust account, in his role he was not involved in the management or reconciliation of the trust account. He stated the firm's bookkeeper worked with N. Clayton to manage all banking accounts of the firm, including the trust account.

b. He believed the firm had recently been successfully audited by the State Bar.

c. He understood that the firm's trust account had been reconciled monthly for years within ten days of month's end by the office bookkeeper with oversight by N. Clayton.

d. N. Clayton told him that as she printed out previously obtained forms for submission to the State Bar, the computer she used automatically printed the date of printing on the documents. She could have reprinted the forms on another computer with no date added, but saw no problem with removing the dates that would have incorrectly indicated when the statements were prepared.

30. N. Clayton responded in a letter dated April 28, 2017, in which she stated:

a. Since she met with the State Bar deputy counsel the preceding year [on November 10, 2016], the firm began doing the three-way reconciliations monthly between the 5th and 10th day of each month.

b. She reviewed the documents to be delivered to the State Bar late on the night of March 26, 2017. She noticed that on many of the documents there were a lot of scribbles and notes from where the reconciliation had been done and she reprinted the documents. She did so because she wanted to provide the State Bar with copies of documents that didn't have so much "chicken scratch" on them. When she printed off clean copies, one of the computers she used printed the date of printing on the documents.

c. The printed date alarmed her because she did not want the State Bar to think the reports were being printed just for compliance with the subpoena.

d. She wasn't sure what to do, but decided to white-out the date on the documents she had reprinted.

e. R. Coulter pointed out to her that she had not filled in the date on the top page of when the reconciliations were performed. She told him they were prepared between the 5th and 10th of each month.

31. On April 13, 2017, the State Bar wrote to R. Myrick and called to his attention comment [27] of Rule 1.15 discussing the professional responsibility of any lawyer who deposits entrusted funds into a trust account regardless of whether the lawyer directly participates in the administration of the trust account. R. Myrick was invited to provide any additional response he wished to have considered by May 12, 2017.

32. On April 17, 2017, the State Bar wrote to R. Coulter and noted the same information from comment [27] of Rule 1.15. Additionally, the State Bar called to R. Coulter's attention that the firm had not successfully completed its random audit, and that the documents with the whited-out dates were not previously obtained forms but rather electronically accessed bank records and software reports containing handwritten reconciliation notes made after the records were printed. R. Coulter was invited to provide any additional response he wished to have considered by May 12, 2017.

33. On April 28, 2017, the State Bar sent N. Clayton a letter asking her to explain why she had failed to provide the three-way reconciliations repeatedly requested of her on November 10, 2016, January 4, 2017, and February 7, 2017 prior to the issuance of the subpoenas, if the reconciliations had been done monthly as she claimed. The State Bar also asked for the original documents with "scribbles and notes" that she claimed to have replaced with clean documents on which she whited-out the print dates. N. Clayton's response was due May 19, 2017.

34. On May 1, 2017, the State Bar sent R. McClanahan a letter noting his failure to respond to the letter of notice served upon him on April 4, 2017.

35. On May 5, 2017, the State Bar sent a letter to J. Clayton noting his failure to respond to the State Bar's letter served upon him on March 30, 2017, and asking him to provide his response by May 19, 2017.

36. On May 9, 2017, R. McClanahan responded to the State Bar's May 1, 2017 letter and stated the firm delivered all subpoenaed documents and he had not received any response to those materials.

37. On May 10, 2017, the State Bar responded to R. McClanahan that the letter of notice expressly addressed the documents delivered by the firm and required his response to concerns raised by those documents. R. McClanahan was given until May 26, 2017 to provide a response that addressed the issues raised in the letter of notice.

Response from all Defendants

38. On May 26, 2017, Defendants sent the State Bar a letter, signed by each Defendant. In this letter, the Defendants stated the following:

a. The firm is performing three-way reconciliations monthly, between the 5th and 10th of each month.

b. In preparation for submission of the documents on March 27, 2017, N. Clayton reviewed the documents and realized many of the documents contained scribbles and notes from where the reconciliation had been done. Therefore, she reprinted the documents on March 27, 2017.

c. When she reprinted the documents on March 27, 2017, the date of printing was automatically printed on the documents, which would give the false impression that the reconciliations were performed on March 27, 2017.

d. The above explanation addresses the second concern raised by the State Bar in the Defendants' grievances, in that the State Bar alleged that they attempted to mislead the State Bar concerning when the reconciliations were conducted by applying, or directing another to apply, white-out tape to dates showing the supporting trust account reports and bank documents were printed on March 26 and March 27, 2017.

e. While the documents were printed on March 26 and March 27, 2017, the actual reconciliations provided to the State Bar were conducted between the 5th and 10th of each month.

f. The firm had elected to utilize the multi-lawyer firm procedures of Rule 1.15-4 and anticipated providing the attendant documentation to the State Bar within the following two weeks.

g. Regarding the State Bar's request for the pages with "scribbles" that were purportedly replaced with the reprinted pages, the shredding company was retrieving the documents and the firm would provide them to the State Bar the following week.

39. N. Clayton was the source of the information for the statements made in the May 26, 2017 letter.

40. The statement made by Defendants in the May 26, 2017 letter that the reconciliations provided to the State Bar had been conducted between the 5th and 10th of each month during the pertinent time period was inaccurate. N. Clayton had admitted she had not even started using the three-way reconciliation form until after November 2016, and the supporting documents dated March 2017 containing her reconciliation notes indicate the reconciliations provided to the State Bar were done in March 2017.

41. The statement made by Defendants in the May 26, 2017 letter that the pages with whited-out dates provided to the State Bar were reprinted pages to replace previously existing pages containing reconciliation notes was inaccurate. The pages with the whited-out dates primarily consisted of pages with handwritten reconciliation notes and were not clean copies.

42. N. Clayton was the attorney with the firm who worked with the firm's staff on the management and reconciliation of the trust account.

43. In multi-lawyer firms, although one attorney may be designated to oversee management and reconciliation of the trust account utilized by the firm's attorneys, all attorneys in the firm who deposit entrusted funds in the trust account remain professionally responsible for the administration of the trust account in compliance with Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

44. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter were aware that the State Bar had raised concerns that the reconciliations provided to the State Bar were prepared in a manner intended to mislead the State Bar. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter knew N. Clayton had prepared those documents.

45. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter were aware of the State Bar's allegation that the firm's trust account was not being timely reconciled and that the State Bar was making numerous inquiries about the management and reconciliation of the trust account.

46. In light of the notice from the State Bar of integrity-based concerns arising from the materials they knew N. Clayton had compiled and produced to the State Bar, Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter should not have continued to rely upon N. Clayton's representations without substantively verifying the information she was providing to them.

47. In light of the notice from the State Bar of the concern that the required trust account reconciliations were not being timely completed for the firm's trust account and the numerous State Bar inquiries, Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter should not have continued to rely upon the arrangement with N. Clayton to satisfy their professional responsibility for the administration of the trust account without substantively verifying that she was managing and reconciling the trust account in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

48. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter took no steps to ascertain whether the reconciliations required by the Rules of Professional Conduct were being timely completed for the firm's trust account.

Based upon the consent of Plaintiff and Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter and the foregoing stipulated Findings of Fact, the Hearing Panel enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. All the parties are properly before the Hearing Panel and the Panel has jurisdiction over Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter, and the subject matter.

2. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter engaged in conduct constituting grounds for discipline pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28(b)(2) in that Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter violated the Rules of Professional Conduct in effect at the time of the conduct as follows:

a. By failing to ensure that the required reconciliations of the trust account utilized by Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter were conducted timely by the attorney entrusted with that responsibility despite notice that the trust account was not being timely reconciled, Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter failed to satisfy their responsibility for timely reconciliations of their trust account in violation of Rule 1.15-3(d).

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Conclusions of Law, the stipulations of fact by Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter, and with the consent of Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter, the Hearing Panel hereby finds by clear, cogent and convincing evidence the following additional

FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING DISCIPLINE

1. The legal profession is entrusted with the privilege of self-regulation. The Bar's system of self-regulation relies upon attorneys to participate in the process and to provide full and fair disclosures of the pertinent facts.

2. As described above, certain statements in the May 26, 2017 letter signed by all Defendants were not accurate. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter knew at the time they made the statements in the May 26, 2017 letter that the statements were material to the issues under investigation by the State Bar. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter relied upon N. Clayton's representations and made no attempt to substantively verify the information provided to the State Bar in the May 26, 2017 letter. In light of the notice from the State Bar of integrity-based concerns arising from the materials they knew N. Clayton had compiled and produced to the State Bar, Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter acknowledge that they should not have continued to rely upon N. Clayton's representations without substantively verifying the information she was providing to them. There is no evidence of any dishonest motive on the part of Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter. However, attorneys responding to State Bar inquiries need to exercise the care necessary to ensure the information they provide to the State Bar is accurate.

3. The State Bar relies upon attorneys to fully and fairly respond to its inquiries. In this case, however, the State Bar already had knowledge regarding the matters set out in

Defendants' May 26, 2017 letter and was not actually misled by the inaccurate statements made in the letter.

4. Defendants acknowledge that once Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter were aware of the State Bar's allegation that the firm's trust account was not being timely reconciled and that the State Bar was making numerous inquiries about the management and reconciliation of the trust account, they should have proactively ensured their trust account responsibilities were in fact being met through N. Clayton as they had previously thought. A keystone of the public's trust in the legal profession is the proper management by attorneys of attorney trust accounts.

5. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter have taken action to ensure future compliance with their responsibilities for proper administration of any trust account they utilize.

6. J. Clayton has arranged for an associate with the law firm to become the firm's Trust Account Oversight Officer in compliance with Rule 1.15-4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. J. Clayton has also retained the services of an accountant familiar with the trust account requirements in the Rules of Professional Conduct to aid the firm's current bookkeeper and new Trust Account Oversight Officer with establishing compliant reconciliation processes. The bookkeeper who J. Clayton discovered had interfered with his receipt of State Bar mail is no longer working for the firm.

7. R. Coulter has opened his own law office and now has two separate trust accounts he maintains, one for real estate transactions and another for other entrusted funds. R. Coulter is directly and personally involved in ensuring compliance with all trust account requirements. R. Coulter has also taken the following voluntary proactive actions to assist with and ensure compliance: he has installed software specifically designed for attorney trust accounts and particularly real estate practices, and he has retained the services of a trust account management company that integrates with his software and online banking information to provide him with daily two-way reconciliations, detailed monthly three-way reconciliations with statements, and daily alerts for any activity he did not initiate.

8. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter have been practicing between 38 – 48 years and have established reputations for good character.

9. Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter have no prior discipline.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Additional Findings Regarding Discipline, the Hearing Panel enters the following

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DISCIPLINE

1. The Hearing Panel considered all of the factors enumerated in 27 N.C. Admin. Code 1B.0116(f)(1), (2) and (3) of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar. The Hearing

Panel concludes that there are no factors under § 1B.0116(f)(1) or (2) applicable Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter. The Hearing Panel concludes that the following factors under .0116(f)(3) are applicable:

27 N.C. Admin. Code 1B.0116(f)(3)

a. Factor (A), No history of prior disciplinary offenses;

b. Factor (C), Absence of selfish motive;

Factor (J), Interim rehabilitation;

c. Factor (K), Full and free disclosure to the hearing panel and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings;

d. Factor (Q), Excellent character reputation; and

e. Factor (S), Substantial degree of experience in the practice of law.

2. Defendants' continued reliance upon N. Clayton under circumstances indicating they should have taken proactive steps to ensure proper fulfillment of their responsibilities posed potential harm to the profession with respect to statements made to the State Bar, and potential harm to clients with respect to the management of the firm's trust account.

3. The Hearing Panel considered all of the disciplinary options available to it. In light of all of the evidence, the Hearing Panel concluded a reprimand is the appropriate discipline to be issued to J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter.

4. The Hearing Panel considered all lesser sanctions and concluded that discipline short of a reprimand would not adequately protect the public. Imposition of a lesser discipline would fail to acknowledge the seriousness of the offenses Defendants committed and would send the wrong message to members of the Bar and the public regarding the conduct expected of members of the Bar of this State.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Discipline, and with the consent of Defendants J. Clayton, R. Myrick, R. McClanahan, and R. Coulter, the Hearing Panel hereby enters the following

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE

1. Defendants Jerry B. Clayton, Robert W. Myrick, Robert D. McClanahan, and Ronald G. Coulter are hereby REPRIMANDED.

2. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28(c), each Defendant is ordered to complete a continuing legal education course on reconciling trust accounts in addition to the minimum

amount of required continuing legal education hours. This additional continuing legal education course must be completed within six months of the entry of this order.

3. Defendants shall each pay the administrative fees and costs of this proceeding assessed to them, including the costs of each Defendant's deposition, as assessed by the Secretary of the North Carolina State Bar. Each Defendant must pay the costs within 30 days of service upon him of the statement of costs by the Secretary.

Signed by the Chair with the consent of the other Hearing Panel members, this the 15 day of June, 2018.



Donald C. Prentiss, Chair
Disciplinary Hearing Panel

CONSENTED TO BY:

Jennifer A. Porter
Counsel for Plaintiff

Jerry B. Clayton
Defendant

Alan M. Schneider
Counsel for Defendant Jerry B. Clayton

Robert W. Myrick
Defendant

F. Lane Williamson
Counsel for Defendant Robert W. Myrick

Robert D. McClanahan
Defendant

Amos G. Tyndall
Counsel for Defendant Robert D. McClanahan

Ronald G. Coulter
Defendant

Douglas J. Brocker
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

Donald C. Prentiss, Chair
Disciplinary Hearing Panel

CONSENTED TO BY:



Jennifer A. Porter
Counsel for Plaintiff

Jerry B. Clayton
Defendant



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Counsel for Defendant Jerry B. Clayton

Robert W. Myrick
Defendant

F. Lane Williamson
Counsel for Defendant Robert W. Myrick

Robert D. McClanahan
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Counsel for Defendant Ronald G. Coulter

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Signed by the Chair with the consent of the other Hearing Panel members, this the 15 day of June, 2018.

Donald C. Prentiss, Chair
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CONSENTED TO BY:

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Counsel for Plaintiff

Jerry B. Clayton
Defendant

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Counsel for Defendant Jerry B. Clayton



Robert W. Myrick
Defendant



F. Lane Williamson
Counsel for Defendant Robert W. Myrick

Robert D. McClanahan
Defendant

Amos G. Tyndall
Counsel for Defendant Robert D. McClanahan

Ronald G. Coulter
Defendant

Douglas J. Brocker
Counsel for Defendant Ronald G. Coulter

amount of required continuing legal education hours. This additional continuing legal education course must be completed within six months of the entry of this order.

3. Defendants shall each pay the administrative fees and costs of this proceeding assessed to them, including the costs of each Defendant's deposition, as assessed by the Secretary of the North Carolina State Bar. Each Defendant must pay the costs within 30 days of service upon him of the statement of costs by the Secretary.

Signed by the Chair with the consent of the other Hearing Panel members, this the 15 day of June, 2018.

Donald C. Prentiss, Chair
Disciplinary Hearing Panel

CONSENTED TO BY:



Jennifer A. Porter
Counsel for Plaintiff

Jerry B. Clayton
Defendant

Alan M. Schneider
Counsel for Defendant Jerry B. Clayton

Robert W. Myrick
Defendant

F. Lane Williamson
Counsel for Defendant Robert W. Myrick

Robert D. McClanahan
Defendant



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

Donald C. Prentiss, Chair
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

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

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

Douglas J. Brocker
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